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ABSTRACT 
Zimbabwe is a nation ostracized by the developed world and among the lowest per capita 
GDP countries in the world.  While President Mugabe’s governance is now recognized as 
untenable for the future of Zimbabwe, his choices seem to focus on the impact of external 
actors fueling opposition undermining Mugabe’s capability to govern, causing an ever 
more autocratic rule, or a perpetual leadership style, against any opposition to maintain 
his position. 
A consistent repression of opposition parties or individuals has continued to 
secure Mugabe’s position over more than quarter of a century, using whatever methods 
he finds necessary.  The international community must be more cognizant of post-war 
leaders, realizing that the leader of an armed conflict overthrowing an undesirable 
government is not always the right choice for a post-conflict, peacetime leader.  Mugabe 
is a perfect example of the traits and trends such a leader can display that must be 
recognized early to avoid such a secure entrenchment that a failed leader cannot be 
successfully challenged by opposition groups to rectify the situation.  Mugabe’s early 
rhetoric against the constitution, combined with his consistent willingness to use violence 
and intimidation securing his power all indicated a leader not ready to forego his title or 
personal agenda for the good of his nation. 
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Since taking power in 1980, President Robert Mugabe has overseen the rise and 
fall of Zimbabwe as an economic, political, and social leader among southern African 
nations and the Non-Aligned Movement.  The 1980s saw Zimbabwe leading the region’s 
attempts to end apartheid in South Africa and provide economic strength and 
independence for South Africa’s neighbors.  The economy vastly outperformed that of 
the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, showing a 7 percent growth for the decade while the rest 
of Sub-Saharan Africa saw its per capita GDP decline.  Minerals were a major export, 
and Zimbabwe was known as the “breadbasket of the region.”1  Zimbabwe was held up 
in the 1980s as a model for post-independence Africa as well as a positive government 
compared to both its apartheid neighbor, South Africa, and the communist bloc during 
the Cold War.  Domestically, Mugabe faced opposition from the former Rhodesian 
government, now organized as the Republican Front (RF) party and led by Rhodesia’s 
former prime minister, Ian Smith, and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), 
the original opposition party to both colonial rule and then white rule.  ZAPU was led by 
its leader of over twenty years, Joshua Nkomo.   
Moving into the 1990s, Zimbabwe adopted economic structural adjustment 
programs (SAPs), liberalizing its economy, and removing much of the socialized 
protections its population and industries had enjoyed, but saw its economy suffer as a 
result.  Reaching the end of the 1990s, a political opposition was firmly formed and some 
Zimbabweans started to question the leadership of Mugabe.   
By the start of the twenty-first century, Mugabe had enacted catastrophic land 
reform, removing the white farmers, and plunging Zimbabwe into economic freefall.  
Today, Zimbabwe stands as a nation ostracized by the developed world and economically 
                                                 
1 Paul Keetch, “Zimbabwe:  Replenishing the Breadbasket,” Public Policy Research 14, no. 2 (2007), 
146. 
 2
situated among the lowest per capita GDP countries in the world.2  While Mugabe’s 
choices on land reform are recognized as a final cause of the economic decline, what 
explains these choices: the impact of external actors fueling an opposition undermining 
his capability to govern and causing a shift to ever more autocratic rule, or a perpetual 
leadership style, demonstrating a willingness to do whatever it takes against any 
opposition to maintain his position? 
Understanding the path of decline can help Zimbabwe effectively move forward 
with economic, political, and social reconstruction in a post-Mugabe period.  In addition, 
the analysis will identify lessons learned for other countries in similar situations.  The 
U.S. has long-considered the Mugabe regime incompatible with global norms, 
particularly Zimbabwe’s inability to undertake truly democratic elections.  In 2009, the 
State Department stated it would only consider reducing or removing current sanctions 
when they see “evidence of true power sharing as well as inclusive and effective 
governance.”3  By identifying the cause of Mugabe’s autocracy, the U.S. can not only 
provide meaningful aid to Zimbabwe at a time when Mugabe relinquishes power, but, 
perhaps more importantly, aim to recognize steps taken or missed opportunities over the 
past three decades that can be better applied in similar situations elsewhere.  If economic 
adjustment truly robbed Mugabe of the ability to govern acceptably, then the U.S. 
government must recognize the potentially catastrophic effects such adjustments can 
cause.  If, on the other hand, Mugabe is identified as the sole cause of the current 
situation, then the U.S., and in particular the Department of State, must develop better 
ways to both identify and then handle such autocrats in the future, before they become 
entrenched leaders and have the opportunity to destroy their nation. 
There are two schools of thought on Zimbabwe’s decline: one sees the heavy-
handed leadership style of President Mugabe and his cohorts over the past thirty years as 
                                                 
2 CIA World Factbook, “Country Comparison: GDP – Per Capita (PPP),” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryName=Zimbabwe&countryCode=zi&regionCode=af&rank=228
#zi (accessed March 19, 2010). 
3 U.S. Department of State, Robert Wood, “Zimbabwe: Unity Government,” February 3, 2009, 
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/02/115909.htm (accessed August 19, 2009). 
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singularly responsible.  Another sees Mugabe’s leadership style becoming progressively 
more heavy-handed and autocratic over time as a result of international factors.  This 
camp sees external actors, especially the IMF, as the most important determinant of 
Mugabe’s increasingly autocratic style.  Thus, there is a consensus that Mugabe’s 
leadership style is a critical factor in the decline.  However, while the first camp treats it 
as the independent variable, the second camp sees it as an intervening variable, 
identifying a different independent variable: the fallout from structural adjustment.  Each 
side identifies positives or negatives that successfully validate its argument, with no one 
having undertaken a comprehensive start-to-finish analysis of the relationship between 
Mugabe’s leadership style and economic outcomes since 1980.  This thesis seeks to fill 
this gap.  The initial hypothesis is that the first camp’s position will be largely validated. 
Those identifying the heavy-handed leadership style of President Mugabe as the 
independent variable causing Zimbabwe’s economic decline argue this leadership style 
was evident since the early 1980s.  While not denying the economic and social 
improvements of the 1980s, this camp maintains that there was always a “darker side” to 
his regime.4  Indeed, Coltart argues that Mugabe and his cohorts feel compelled to 
maintain power at all costs now because loss of power may lead to their prosecution for 
the “genocide in Matabeleland in the early 1980s” that killed over 20,000 people.5  
Others argue that attacks on the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
after its creation in 1999 mirror the response to political opposition in the 1980s, 
                                                 
4 Robert I. Rotberg, Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy (Cambridge, MA:  World Peace 
Foundation, 2002), 231; Chris McGreal, “Mugabe, ‘the Black Mamba’ Bares His Fangs,” The Guardian, 
February 8, 1999, www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/feb/08/6 (accessed 11 Mar 10); Hevina Dashwood, 
“Mugabe, Zimbabwe, and Southern Africa:  The Struggle for Leadership,” International Journal 57 no. 1 
(2001/2002), 95; Maxwell Zhira, “Uncovering the Reality of State Violence in Western Zimbabwe, 1982–
1987,” Past Imperfect, no. 10 (2004), 67; Jacob Chikuhwa, A Crisis of Governance:  Zimbabwe (New 
York:  Algora Publishing, 2004), 92–95; Martin Meredith, Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for 
Zimbabwe (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 74; John S. Saul and Richard Saunders, “Mugabe, Gramsci, 
and Zimbabwe at 25,” International Journal, Autumn 2005, 959; Ian Phimister, “The Making and 
Meanings of the Massacres in Matabeleland,” Development Dialogue, December 2008, 211; David Coltart, 
“A Decade of Suffering in Zimbabwe:  Economic Collapse and Political Repression under Robert 
Mugabe,” CATO Institute, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity:  Development Policy Analysis, no. 5 
(2008), 11, http://www.cato.org/pubs/dpa/dpa5.pdf (accessed 9 Mar 10); Ralph Peters, The Lion and the 
Snake:  A Strategic View of South Africa and Zimbabwe, (Quantico, VA:  Center for Emerging Threats and 
Opportunities, 2003), 10. 
5 Coltart, “A Decade of Suffering,” 1, 12. 
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demonstrating that the Mugabe government’s response to political opposition has always 
been oppressive and autocratic.6  Some suggest that the failure of the international 
community to respond to Mugabe’s early repression “created a sense of impunity in the 
minds of the ZANU-PF leadership,” which emboldened decades of repression.7  This 
camp also cites the decision by Mugabe to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) as another example of what they see as an autocratic approach Mugabe has 
consistently taken to decision-making.  Providing initially 6,000—later 11,000—
Zimbabwean troops to the DRC in support of Laurent Kabila, in return for mineral 
contracts, Mugabe failed to coordinate any part of the deployment with the Parliament, 
instead arbitrarily making troop commitments.  Those in this camp argue that while 
Mugabe and his top generals personally acquired diamond and cobalt mining resources 
from southern Congo, Zimbabwe’s economy paid $5 million per week for the 
deployment, draining what little capital the state had to support its population as it 
emerged from SAP-induced economic hardship.8   
The second camp views the 1980s in a different light, noting the strengths of the 
political system, as well as the positive development track Mugabe steered the newly 
independent country down.9  This camp argues Mugabe ensured a stable transition of 
power in 1980 and over the next decade oversaw the continued success of the economic 
powerhouse he inherited, expanding and supporting a system built to promote 
Zimbabwe’s strengths while sharing the wealth with its black African citizens.  
Protectionist policies were in place for the agricultural and industrial sectors while state-
                                                 
6 Ernest Kadembo, “Dynamic Positioning for Survival in Political Marketing Warfare:  Mugabe’s 
Maneuverings out of Crises in Zimbabwe,” Journal of Politics and Law 1 no. 1 (2008), 2, 6, 12; Robert I. 
Rotberg, “It’s Time to Loosen Mugabe’s Grip,” Christian Science Monitor, October 17, 2000, 11. 
7 Phimister, “Making and Meanings of the Massacres,” 210-11; Coltart, “A Decade of Suffering,” 11; 
Peters, Lion and the Snake, 10. 
8 Rotberg, Ending Autocracy, 233; Meredith, Mugabe, 148; Robert I. Rotberg, “Africa’s Mess, 
Mugabe’s Mayhem,” Foreign Affairs, no. 79 (2000), 53; Marian Tupy, “Botswana and Zimbabwe: a Tale 
of Two Countries,” CATO Institute, March 14, 2008, http://www.cat.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9399 
(accessed July 20, 2009); Robert I Rotberg, “Worst of the Worst:  Dealing with Repressive and Rogue 
Nations (Cambridge, MA:  World Peace Foundation, 2007), 169. 
9 Lloyd Sachikonye, “Whither Zimbabwe?  Crisis and Democratisation” Review of African Political 
Economy 29, no. 91 (2002), 13-14; Sandra J. Maclean and Fahimul Quadir, “Structural Adjustment and the 
Response of Civil Society in Bangladesh and Zimbabwe:  A Comparative Analysis,” New Political 
Economy, 2, no. 1(1997). 
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funded healthcare and education investment boosted social well-being for all 
Zimbabweans.10  According to this analysis, “Mugabe was an acknowledged 
authoritarian ruler, but the courts remained independent, and their judgments were 
respected.”11  For Africa in the 1980s, his regime was liberal.  This camp thus identifies 
the roots of Zimbabwe’s decline in the 1990s, not the 1980s.  Drawing upon Collier’s 
argument that when national income declines below $2700 per capita (in 2009 dollars), 
democracies become more prone to political violence,12 the second camp asserts that 
SAP-induced economic downturn in Zimbabwe caused a social crisis, that led to political 
challenges for Mugabe’s rule, which in turn led to his increased autocracy.13  They point 
to increasingly draconian tactics used by the IMF to coerce Zimbabwe into following its 
programs as the 1990s wore on, including the withholding of new credit to ratchet up 
pressure, as the driving factor in Mugabe’s increasingly heavy-handed and autocratic 
style.14  They also suggest that the international community’s withholding of $700 
million intended to aid those adversely affected by liberalization and devaluation for over 
a year was a key contributor to economic, social and thus political decline.  This lack of 
funding is argued to have set off upwardly spiraling government debt, as the government 
was forced to take new IMF and World Bank loans to backfill the costs of the social 
development programs (SDPs).  These requirements for aid, in turn, opened the door to 
the international financial institutions (IFIs) to mandate accelerated adjustment 
programs.15  Finally, some in this camp suggest that the interlinked system of the IFIs 
and bilateral donors contributed to the decline, since this gave the IMF the power to 
                                                 
10 Tor Skalnes, “The State, Interest Groups, and Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe,” The Journal of 
Development Studies 29, no. 3 (1993), 401. 
11 Robert I Rotberg, “Worst of the Worst,” 168. 
12 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes:  Democracy in Dangerous Places (NY:  Harper Collins, 
2009), 21. 
13 Sachikonye, “Whither Zimbabwe,” 15; Donald Mavunduse, “Have the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund Contributed to the Current Famine in Southern Africa?”  CQ Researcher 12, 
no. 39 (2002), 937; Owen Sichone, “Zimbabwe’s Economic Policies, 1980-2002,” DPMN Bulletin X 
(2002). 
14 Patrick Bond, “Zimbabwe’s Hide and Seek with the IMF:  Imperialism, Nationalism, and the South 
African Proxy,” Review of African Political Economy 32, no. 106 (2005), 613. 
15 Colin Stoneman, “The World Bank Demands Its Pound of Flesh,” Review of African Political 
Economy, no. 53(1992), 95. 
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disrupt all external funding in its effort to pressure the Zimbabwean government to force 
through economically and socially disruptive SAPs.16  This, they argue, left Mugabe 
unable to support the successful policies of the 1980s and instead forced him into a more 
and more autocratic defense of his leadership. 17  Brown even notes Zimbabwe initially 
had a better, more gradual, plan for structural adjustment that could have smoothed the 
transition for those affected, but was forced by the IMF to adopt their more aggressive 
approach.18   
The first camp responds to the second camp’s argument by asserting that the 
design of SAP was determined by the autocracy and greed of Mugabe and those around 
him.  Thus, heavy-handed autocratic leadership style is the driving factor, and SAPs and 
their economic and political affects an intervening variable.  Dashwood and Cliffe state 
the Zimbabwean economy was not in such trouble at the end of the 1980s as was 
typically the case for countries adopting SAP.  Instead, they suggest the SAPs were 
simply a means for profiteering by Zimbabwe’s political elites who had used their status 
to acquire industrial and agricultural investments throughout Zimbabwe.  This 
convergence of political and economic groups—what Dashwood calls the 
“embourgeoisement of the bureaucratic and political elites”—led to a shift away from 
expensive socialism towards a capitalist approach seeking more export profit (particularly 
from a desired increase in manufacturing exports).19  Others in the first camp accept the  
 
 
                                                 
16 Hevina Dashwood, “Inequality, Leadership and the Crisis in Zimbabwe.”  International Journal, 57, 
no. 2 (2002), 82; Carolyn Jenkins, “The Politics of Economic Policy-Making in Zimbabwe,” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 35, no. 4 (1997), 600; Chikuhwa, Crisis of Governance, 274. 
17 Mavunduse, “Have the World Bank and IMF Contributed,” 937;  Rachel Swarns in her 2002 NY 
Times article, while not specifically supporting Mugabe, cites the needed support of those who rally behind 
him, “Criticized by the West, Mugabe is a Hero to Many.” New York Times, September 6, 2002; Sichone, 
“Zimbabwe’s Economic Policies, 1980–2002”; Stoneman, “The World Bank Demands,” 94; Dashwood, 
“Inequality,” 71. 
18 William Brown, “The EU and Structural Adjustment:  The Case of Lome IV and Zimbabwe,” 
Review of African Political Economy 26, no. 79 (1999), 79. 
19 Hevina S. Dashwood, Zimbabwe: the Political Economy of Transformation (Toronto, Canada:  
University of Toronto Press, 2000), 9; Lionel Cliffe, “Were They Pushed or Did They Jump?  Zimbabwe 
and the World Bank,” Southern Africa Report 6, no. 4 (1991), 26; see also Jan Willem Gunning, “The 
Trade Policy Review of Zimbabwe,” World Economy 19, no. 5 (1996), 160.  
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appropriateness of the SAPs, but maintain that its adverse economic, and thus political, 
effects resulted from “the government’s unwillingness to adhere strictly to the adjustment 
programme.”20 
The debate in the literature revolves around the source of Mugabe’s autocracy.  
Those asserting that Mugabe has not changed, always demonstrating a willingness to use 
heavy-handed measures to maintain his power, assert that nothing outside of his decisions 
have been able to counter the effects of his autocratic actions.  While they find examples 
of heavy-handedness throughout his leadership, this camp fails to identify how he 
managed to maintain economic success throughout the 1980s and then watched his 
autocratic methods ultimately destroy the economy by the turn of the century.  Is this 
because each of his actions simply had a compounding effect or was there a singular 
tipping point that must have occurred?  The second camp believes there was a tipping 
point, the mandate of SAPs.  They argue the role of international organizations and their 
structural adjustment directive undermined the ability of Mugabe to maintain his power, 
established by the relative successes of 1980s Zimbabwe versus the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  As a result of this success, they seek a shift in the conditions providing Mugabe 
his support and see SAPs as that shift.  Without a swing away from the socialized 
successes of the 1980s, Mugabe—still the hero of Zimbabwe’s independence struggle to 
many21—would not have faced the political challenges that he controlled with ever-
increasing autocracy.  What this camp fails to account for is the impact of Mugabe’s 
harsher actions in the 1980s while the economy was succeeding.  This thesis will rectify 
these shortcomings by both camps.   
A within-case comparison analyzing two distinct periods of Mugabe’s rule will be 
used to investigate which explanation is better supported by available evidence.  The first 
period will cover April 1980, independence for Zimbabwe, to 1986.  This period 
represents one of strong economy before the SAPs were implemented, international 
support, and the initial post-independence period as Mugabe established his government.  
It also covers the first post-independence national elections and the period of primary 
                                                 
20 Maclean and Quadir, “Structural Adjustment;” Gunning, “Trade Policy Review of Zimbabwe,” 163. 
21 “Criticized by the West, Mugabe is a Hero to Many,” New York Times, September 6, 2002. 
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opposition from Nkomo’s ZAPU party before they were finally subdued to a point where 
a merger with Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 
party became inevitable, though not covering the entire period from the point of 
inevitable merger to the final signing of the merger agreement in December 1987.  The 
second period will cover 1998 to 2003.  This period represents one of sharp economic 
decline after the adoption of SAP, accelerated land reform, and the creation and 
establishment of widespread opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC).  It also covers three national elections, including the first national electoral loss 
Mugabe would encounter, as well as a period where international opposition to Mugabe’s 
governance became far more widespread.  By assessing the reaction, or lack of reaction, 
by Mugabe and his government to events during each period, an assessment of level of 
autocracy will be possible.  Events signifying opposition to Mugabe’s rule, such as public 
protests, strikes, media opposition, political opposition, elections, or formation of 
political opposition, along with the reaction, or lack thereof, of the government, will be 
identified utilizing media reports, secondary literature, election observer reports, and non-
governmental organization reports.  Unique to this case is a study by the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ), that has consistently been used 
in the study of 1980s Zimbabwe and the brutal attacks carried out by the government and 
its army particularly in Matabeleland.  Though not released until 1997 due to the 
commission’s inability to accurately and safely collect data until then, it has compiled the 
foremost collection of data into the political violence inflicted on Zimbabweans during 
the mid-1980s using both data from other sources as well as the commission’s own 
investigations.  The CCJPZ itself is a “Commission of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference” 
based in Harare, and other offices around Zimbabwe.  It seeks to: 
Make people aware of their rights and duties as citizens … investigate 
allegations of injustice which it considers to merit attention, and to take 
appropriate action,… and to advise the Bishop’s Conference on the human 
rights situation pertaining from time to time.22 
                                                 
22 CCJPZ Home Page.  http://www.hrforumzim.com/members/ccjpz/ccjptext.htm (accessed May 31, 
2010). 
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The primary media sources used for collecting data of opposition actions and government 
reactions comes from newspaper reports.  The Guardian newspaper is primarily used 
until the end of the 1990s when local Zimbabwean independent newspapers reports 
become available in electronic archives.  While The Guardian was certainly not the only 
newspaper reporting on Zimbabwe during this period, it was one of the few who 
maintained a dedicated reporter in Harare for the entire time, providing reporting from 
Zimbabwe itself, rather than a neighboring country, or even from a western capital 
headquarters of one of the international newspapers.  Additionally, Kalley, Schoeman, 
and Andor have produced a chronology of key political events for several southern 
African countries, including Zimbabwe, from independence to 1997.23  This will be used 
to offer a second source to provide a validation of information taken from newspaper 
reports and the CCJPZ report for the 1980–1986 period of study.   
Once the two periods are analyzed, if it can be seen that similar events within 
each time period garnered the same reaction, then it is reasonable to conclude Mugabe’s 
leadership style has not evolved, but has remained constant.  Should this be the case, it 
may be reasonable to conclude Mugabe has always been an autocratic ruler capable of the 
land reform decisions of the twenty-first century, while also providing a cogent case for 
further study to analyze the economic success of the 1980s versus the disaster later, 
having ruled out the level of autocracy as an explanatory factor.  If autocracy is found 
prevalent in the 1980s in an escalating trend of politically convenient, but economically 
damaging, decisions, this could explain the 1980s versus beyond quandary, while still 
determining a perpetual case of autocracy for Mugabe.  Finally, if public actions and 
government responses are seen to be altered during or following SAP adoption, then an 
evolution of Mugabe’s leadership style, resulting from the SAPs undermining of his 
governance, can be determined. 
The research will perform the analysis of the two time periods over two chapters: 
independence to 1986 and 1998–2003, followed by a concluding chapter providing the 
                                                 
23 Jacqueline A. Kalley, Elna Schoeman and L.E. Andor, Southern African Political History: A 
Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1999). 
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final, within-case comparative analysis.  Chapter I assesses Zimbabwe as it emerged from 
independence up to the point where ZAPU had become a ‘lame duck’ opposition party 
resigned to an eventual merger with ZANU though still finalizing the terms of a merger 
with ZANU that would not actually occur until an agreement was signed in December 
1987.  Chapter I analyzes the social and economic successes of the 1980s, along with the 
handling of political challenges to Mugabe by his government.  Levels of political 
challenge (for example, political opposition parties, negative media, protests, and strikes), 
and the extent of response, or lack thereof, are observed.   
Chapter II encompasses the period of economic implosion, land reform, and 
establishment of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as a tenable opposition 
party across Zimbabwe.  Changes in economic and social situations for the population, 
along with political challenges leveled at Mugabe, are ascertained.  Reaction to these 
actions are identified.  Key throughout the comparative analysis (Chapter III), is the level 
of heavy-handedness utilized by Mugabe.  While there were differing reactions from 
Mugabe—ranging from alleged mass-murder, threats of prosecution or physical harm, 
closure of organizations opposing him, or denial of events he was accused of—the key 
question will be whether these differing responses always existed, and always in response 
to the same type of challenge, or if there were a shift in Mugabe’s tactics. 
Chapter IV of the research assesses whether there appears to be a change between 
the actions of the 1980s, by either the population or Mugabe, and that of the post-SAP 
period, using the within-case comparison, and based on the findings of Chapters I and II.  
If the actions and reactions remained constant throughout, then it is likely that Mugabe’s 
decisions over the past thirty years can bear responsibility for the situation Zimbabwe 
finds itself in today.  If, on the other hand, through comparative analysis of the two 
periods, a change in action and/or reaction can be identified, then it must be determined 
that Mugabe has evolved into the autocrat of the twenty-first century.  By accepting that 
any change in opposition and the economy were caused by SAP, it almost overstates their 
significance, providing any possible bias away from my hypothesis and in favor of the 
other camp. 
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II. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO OPPOSITION DURING 
ECONOMIC STABILITY: 1980–1986 
This chapter seeks to analyze the initial period of Zimbabwean independence, 
from April 1980 through the first post-independence general elections in 1985 and the 
follow-on process by which opposition party eventually merged with the ruling party – a 
period generally regarded as one of economic and diplomatic success for Zimbabwe with 
a stable economy and positive international relationships.  The first post-independence 
year (1981) was characterized by rapid growth, largely as a result of the removal of 
international sanctions imposed on apartheid Rhodesia.  Zimbabwe’s economy showed 
limited growth but vastly outperformed the average economy of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(excluding South Africa), with an overall growth rate for the 1980s decade of 7.1 percent 
versus a decline of 8.2 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa.24  “[C]compared with many other 
countries at the time, Zimbabwe’s success record for the 1980s might be described as 
modestly successful.”25  While Zimbabwe was viewed as a model of post-independence 
reform—particularly when situated next to the apartheid government of South Africa, 
that progressively became a more amplified global issue as the 1980s went on, and a 
larger western focus on the Cold War—with Mugabe overseeing a smooth transition of 
power within to a democratic regime, this chapter will show that in fact it was a period in 
which all forms of opposition were suppressed and a de facto single-party state attained.  
This analysis of government responses to opposition during a period of economic success 
will then be compared to the responses of the 1990s and early 2000s when the economy 
was imploding to determine how much of an effect the economic crisis had on the level 
of repression. 
Emerging from independence, Zimbabwe was a multi-party democracy led by the 
victor in the war for independence and majority rule.  The Lancaster House constitution 
called for a President, who was head of state, and a Prime Minister, who was head of 
government.  Robert Mugabe led the government and nation, while President Canaan 
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Banana assumed the less powerful presidency.  As he took power, Mugabe called for 
unity, putting national needs before party desires, removing racial barriers, and progress 
to be achieved by “join[ing] hands in a new amity … as Zimbabweans.”26  In his address 
to the nation the night before Zimbabwe’s independence he made a personal pledge: “If 
yesterday I fought as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same 
national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself.”27  Having reassured those who had 
lost power of their security and inclusion, he set out his vision for the social development 
of Zimbabwe: “There are people without land who need land, people without jobs who 
need jobs, children without schools who need schools and patients without hospitals who 
need them.”28  The social development plan was codified in the government release of 
Growth with Equity: an Economic Policy Statement, which laid out Mugabe’s vision for 
“the attainment in Zimbabwe of a truly socialist, egalitarian and democratic society in 
conditions of sustained growth with equality.”29  With abundant natural resources, a 
strong agricultural system, an established manufacturing base, and international support, 
Mugabe possessed all the tools for a successful execution of the plan. 
Joshua Nkomo, the original opposition leader to both colonial rule and subsequent 
apartheid rule, emerged at independence as the defeated leader of the ZAPU, now the 
main opposition party.  Nkomo had expected a government to be formed by all the 
former fighters from the liberation movement, with him as leader, the position he felt he 
had held since the 1957 creation of ZAPU.30  Instead, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF won 57 of the 
80 seats open to black members of parliament (MPs).  ZAPU won 20, and the United 
African National Council (UANC) led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, which held power 
briefly as part of a failed Internal Settlement plan between the end of the Smith regime in 
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Rhodesia and the creation of independent Zimbabwe, won three.  An additional 20 seats 
were filled by representatives of the white minority, elected separately according to the 
provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement.31  Former Prime Minister Ian Smith led 
the Republican Front (RF), which won all twenty of the white seats.   
Despite winning an absolute majority of seats in parliament, Mugabe initially 
offered Nkomo the seat of President, but Nkomo declined it, fearing he would be 
“deprived of [the] right to speak [his] mind and take a lead on matters of great national 
importance.”32  Following this, Mugabe instead allowed four of 23 cabinet positions to 
ZAPU, including the appointment of Nkomo as Home Affairs Minister.33  The CCJPZ 
maintains that ZANU-PF did not challenge ZAPU’s role in 1980 and 1981, while 
Meredith asserts that Mugabe and ZANU were rallying against Nkomo and ZAPU from 
the very beginning.34  This apparent contradiction arises from the different foci of the two 
studies.  The CCJPZ focused on relations between the former armed wings of ZANU and 
ZAPU, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA).  It notes that while accusations of disruptive 
activities were made by Mugabe and Nkomo against ZIPRA and ZANLA, respectively, 
each avoided direct attacks against the other party and its leader.35  In response to battles 
between the two former military factions in 1980, for example, Mugabe appointed a 
commission to investigate, without holding the ZAPU leadership responsible.36  Other 
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32 Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns, 39. 
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high ranking government officials were more inclined to associate ZIPRA violence with 
ZAPU, suggesting in late 1980 that “ZAPU has become the enemy of ZANU.”37   
Meredith, however, focuses on relations between the parties themselves, arguing 
that differing views of the unified government created tension from the outset.  
According to Meredith, Mugabe saw the inclusion of ZAPU in the government as a first 
step towards absorbing ZAPU into ZANU, while Nkomo sought ZAPU inclusion in 
government decision-making as a separate party with independent and potentially 
opposing views.  ZAPU took its opportunity to be included in government decision-
making, but viewed itself as an opposition party, not part of a single voice for the 
government.  Mugabe, recognizing the failure to suppress ZAPU through inclusion, 
bristled at the idea of opposition from within his government, declaring in June 1980 that 
there could be no reconciliation between ZANU and ZAPU as long as ZAPU was not 
willing to recognize the will of the people to be ruled by ZANU.38  Thereafter, Mugabe 
sought to isolate and marginalize ZAPU ministers in general, and Nkomo in particular.  
When he met with tribal chiefs in Matabeleland, Nkomo’s support base, in July, his 
entourage included other senior cabinet ministers and officials, but excluded ZAPU and 
Nkomo in particular.  The New York Times suggested at the time that “among Nkomo 
supporters the journey was bound to be seen as an attempt by the Prime Minister to cut 
away an important part of Nkomo’s political base, further isolating Mr Nkomo and 
enhancing the predominance of Mr Mugabe’s faction.”39  Still, when nine ZAPU officials 
were detained by the security police in November, Nkomo asserted Mugabe had known 
nothing of the arrests, which had been ordered by the Minister of State.40  The repression 
of ZAPU became undeniable in November 1980 when the government invoked the 
Emergency Powers Act to ban three ZAPU rallies while authorizing a ZANU rally.41  In 
January 1981 several newspapers were nationalized, including the Herald in Harare and 
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the Bulawayo Chronicle.  Nkomo’s criticism of this move included the statement: “this is 
probably my last free statement through our media.”42  In response, he was demoted from 
Minister of Home Affairs to Minister in Charge of Public Service.43  Thereafter ZAPU 
and other opposition groups were largely shut out by the state-owned media, forced to 
rely on the remaining independent and international media outlets to be heard.   
In 1982 Mugabe retreated from the unity government, while simultaneously 
shifting power from the government to the ruling party.  This move would prove pivotal 
in connecting the actions of the government that Mugabe led, and the party that Mugabe 
led.  In early 1982, he announced that “all future government policies would first be 
approved by ZANU-PF”—a move immediately denounced by Nkomo.44  At the same 
time, he seized upon opportunities to justify the removal of ZAPU members from the 
unity government.  In February 1982, Mugabe announced that huge arms caches had 
been found on ZAPU-owned land.  Despite these arms caches being no different from 
those found all around Zimbabwe since independence without accusations being leveled 
at ZIPRA or ZANLA,45 Mugabe dismissed Nkomo and Josiah Chinamano, two of the 
four ZAPU ministers, accusing them of plotting to overthrow the government.46  What 
indicates that this was in fact a political move, rather than a true feeling of threat to the 
government, was the timing of the announcement.  Nkomo and Dumiso Dabengwa, a 
ZAPU member and former ZIPRA chief of intelligence, had formed a committee with 
Mugabe and his security minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa to resolve the very issue of 
arms caches throughout the country left from the two military wings as they initially 
clashed following independence.  However, before the committee was able to conclude 
its recommended course of action, Mugabe announced the arms cache discovery he used 
to remove Nkomo from the cabinet.47  In so doing, he warned “the elements responsible 
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43 Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns, 61; New York Times, January 11, 1981. 
44 Chikuhwa, Crisis of Governance, 92. 
45 CCJPZ, Breaking the Silence, 41. 
46 The Guardian, October 4, 1984; September 24, 1985. 
47 Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns, 63. 
 16
that if they wish to start another civil war they should be careful”48  Mugabe asserted that 
Nkomo must stand trial49 and likened working with him to having a “cobra in the house,” 
going on to say that “the only way to effectively deal with a snake is to strike and destroy 
its head.”50  While Mugabe seized on the presence of weapons to link the opposition to a 
war, this would become a habitual pattern in future years whether weapons or violence 
were involved.  Following the firings of Nkomo and Chinamano, the government 
continued its pressure on ZAPU to demonstrate the futility of opposition, arresting two 
senior members of ZAPU, General Lookout Masuku, Deputy Head of the Army, and 
Dumiso Dabengwa, a former national defense advisor, and charged them with treason 
and illegal possession of arms,51 while another ZAPU MP, Akim Ndlovu, was detained 
under the Emergency Powers Act.52  Finally, in June 1982, shots were fired into the 
houses of Mugabe and Minister of Defense Enos Nkala by ex-ZIPRA members.53  
Following the shootings, the accusations ceased to segregate the former ZIPRA members 
from the ZAPU leadership, instead the government declared a clear link between the 
actions of ex-ZIPRA and the current ZAPU leadership while imposing a curfews, 
detentions, and weapons searches throughout Bulawayo, the heartland of ZAPU support. 
Mugabe would continue over the course of the 1980s to blame internationally 
sponsored violence on ZAPU, using this as a justification for the harsh treatment of both 
ZAPU leaders and the Matabeleland population supporting it.54  Mugabe increasingly 
blamed ZAPU supporters for all criminal and political violence in Zimbabwe, describing 
those involved as “dissidents” aiming to overthrow the government in alliance with 
apartheid South Africa.  Although such accusations had been made prior to the Nkomo 
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and Chinamano firings, they were directed at the leadership of ZAPU only thereafter, 
marking “the final rift.”55  In reality, the vast majority of the violence was sponsored by 
South Africa and RENAMO rebels in Mozambique (themselves sponsored by the South 
African government) seeking to promote instability in Zimbabwe for the purpose of 
weakening the movement for majority rule in South Africa.  CCJPZ concludes that 
“dissidents were few, numbering no more than around 400 at their peak.”  While 
Mugabe’s actions were veiled as response to violence, the actions undertaken by his 
government vastly exceeded the levels of violence encountered.  Despite the limited 
numbers of actual dissidents, along with Nkomo’s persistent denial of ZAPU 
involvement and repeated appeals for all dissidents to cease their activities no matter who 
they felt they were supporting,56 the government pursued ZAPU members unrelentingly 
throughout the mid-1980s in the name of eliminating dissident violence.  In response to 
increased violence in Matabeleland, in July 1982 a formal curfew was imposed in 
Bulawayo between the hours of 9 pm and 4 am.  The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs 
threatened “worse things… if [Matabeleland residents] continued to support 
dissidents.”57  In September the government restricted the movement of foreign media 
into Matabeleland58 and banned political rallies scheduled by Nkomo and ZAPU.59  In 
March 1983 Nkomo’s home was raided, and he was placed under house arrest, while as 
many as 1000 of his supporters were detained.60  Nkomo and most of the ZAPU 
leadership fled to Botswana in fear for their lives.61  In February 1984 the government 
imposed a food embargo on Matabeleland South, the home of Nkomo and largely 
supportive of ZAPU, and detained an estimated 8,000 in the following months.62  
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Beginning in 1984 the ZANU Youth movement became a primary vehicle of intimidation 
in Matabeleland.  Separate from the army, and particularly the Fifth Brigade, the ZANU 
youth executed violence and intimidation of the ZAPU population under the auspices of 
the ZANU party.  It was involved in attacks on ZAPU and other minority parties, as well 
as coercing people to attend ZANU rallies.63   
Mugabe’s pursuit of not only the leaders of ZAPU, but also its supporters, sought 
to marginalize the party, leaving it unable to speak out against the government and 
establishing a level of fear that would preclude support from its section of the population.  
The Army Fifth Brigade became operational in December 1982, made up almost entirely 
of former ZANLA forces and trained by North Korea.  They wore different uniforms 
from the regular army and had an abbreviated chain of command, with their brigade 
leaders “answering directly to Mugabe’s army commanders.”64  At the passing out 
ceremony Mugabe urged the troops to “start dealing with dissidents.”65  In January 1983 
the Fifth Brigade was deployed to Matabeleland North to execute an operation named 
Gukurahundi, a Shona expression meaning the rain which washes away the chaff before 
the spring rains.  Fifth Brigade troops convicted of violent crimes and human rights 
abuses in 1984 were pardoned by Mugabe, reinforcing to the remainder of the Fifth 
Brigade the backing and assured protection of the Mugabe government.66  In March 1983 
journalists had uncovered decomposed bodies, part of a group of 17 or 18 young men 
killed in the previous three weeks by the Fifth Brigade troops.67  Following an initial 
period when the Fifth Brigade had focused its attacks on former ZIPRA soldiers and 
ZAPU officials,68 between March and November 1983, Fifth Brigade troops summarily 
executed accused dissidents, and undertook a wider campaign of attacks on anyone not 
carrying a ZANU-PF membership card.  There were large numbers of disappearances at 
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the hands of the Fifth Brigade with assistance from Central Intelligence Organization 
(CIO) officials, who “removed men from buses, trains, or from their homes, and they 
were never seen again….  Some men who were killed or detained were merely young 
men who were of ‘dissident age,’” and families of the dead were reportedly shot simply 
for weeping.69  By the end of 1983, “possessing a ZANU-PF card became essential for 
safety.”70  Responding to the growing criticism, the government established a 
commission to investigate the activities of Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland in September 
1983, but its report was never made public, if one was even produced.71  By the end of 
1986 approximately 20,000 people had died at the hands of the Fifth Brigade.72  The 
Fifth Brigade succeeded in stifling ZAPU.  With the exception of limited reports of 
“dissidents” supportive of ZAPU carrying out retaliatory actions in Matabeleland, 
Nkomo and ZAPU were largely silent in 1983 and 1984.   
National elections were scheduled for March 1985, though they were later 
deferred until June/July as a result of administrative delays in registering voters.73  In 
July 1984 Nkomo had held his first rally in Harare in over two years in front of more than 
2,000 supporters where he claimed had been unable to campaign in Matabeleland 
because of curfews and military presence and again denied ZAPU support for violence or 
maintenance of weapons caches.74  As part of its efforts to demonstrate willingness for a 
free and fair election to the international community, the government lifted the ban on 
ZAPU meetings in the Midlands and Mashonaland West in September 198475 and 
withdrew the Fifth Brigade from Matabeleland.76  In October, ZAPU held its national 
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conference at which Nkomo, already rallying the party supporters against Mugabe for the 
upcoming election, railed: “The ZANU leadership today is concerned with only one 
matter—that of maintaining themselves in power… in less than five years the promise of 
independence has turned into a reality of suspicion, terror and failure.”77   
 
Figure 1.   ZANU-PF Youth Attacks June 1984–August 198578 
The pattern of repression established in the previous five years continued through 
the election season.  ZANU ministers used the Emergency Powers Act to require ZAPU 
to seek police approval prior to any meeting or gathering.79  CIO officials abducted 
opposition supporters80 and were accused of killing members of ZAPU’s central 
committee.81  The UANC also accused ZANU of hiring killers who, in one incident, 
dragged 40 UANC supporters from a train and killed five party officials from the 
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group.82  The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported that in February 1985 
alone 1300 people were detained in Bulawayo, and another 200 ZAPU officials detained 
in the Midlands.83  The ZANU youth movement also expanded its intimidation of 
opposition supporters (Table 1).  In addition, ZANU supporters used mass violence to 
limit ZAPU’s ability to campaign.84   
While violence had underscored the build-up to the elections, the official election 
campaigning was limited to the month of June and saw little violence.  Instead ZANU 
utilized restrictive timelines as ways to unsettle the opposition party from smoothly 
executing its campaign, while ultimately balancing the disruption with a demonstration of 
inclusion for the international community watching.  Dates for the elections were 
announced by the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on June 3, 1985.  
White voters would vote on June 27 and blacks on July 1 and 2.  Nkomo and other 
opposition leaders immediately filed an application to the court to have the poll delayed, 
on the grounds that the time allowed to register candidates—a process requiring ten 
signatures from that candidate’s constituency85—was too short given that the voters’ rolls 
for constituencies were distributed June 7 and the deadline for submission was 1 pm on  
June 10. 86  The case was taken all the way to the Supreme Court before being finally 
denied.  The government extended registration an additional 28 hours anyway, stating 
“we should bend over backwards to accommodate any sort of grievance to ensure for all 
concerned a free and fair election.”87  There were only limited reports of violence during 
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the official campaigning period.88  The government did, however, ban the symbols for 
both ZAPU and the ZANU-Sithole parties, a particular problem “because of the amount 
of illiteracy in rural areas.”89  Ultimately, Mugabe was “able to claim to have staged a 
reasonably fair election,”90 having backed off from violence and repression long enough 
to allow the perception of a free and fair election before returning to the goal of coercing 
any opposition into submission and envelopment within ZANU once the elections were 
over, even with an expanded majority from the election.  In an example of the 
government’s attempts to temper any outcry over inappropriate elections, the polls were 
even extended two days to ensure all those eligible were able to vote, trying to show 
willingness to assure everyone the chance to vote once as part of a larger attempt to 
demonstrate to the world that the elections were free and fair.  Unfortunately, by this 
point a pattern of intimidation and violence over voters had been established long before 
the polls were officially opened.91  In the end, ZANU extended its majority in parliament, 
winning 64 of the 80 available seats.  Despite the violence in Matabeleland, ZAPU took 
all 15 seats there including Nkomo’s seat, but failed to secure any other victories.  The 
last went to ZANU-Sithole.92  Having attempted inclusion in a unity government after the 
first election, Mugabe this time chose to establish a government solely made up of 
supporters, establishing the role of both ZAPU and Smith’s RF party as opposition parties 
to be suppressed into obsolescence.  Mugabe’s new cabinet included only one non-
ZANU member, a white independent as Minister of Public Service.93 
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After the 1985 election, the hounding of Nkomo recommenced as Mugabe set out 
to negate ZAPU once and for all, forcing them to accept absorption into ZANU.  Nkomo 
was again accused of involvement in dissident activity.  Security forces raided his homes 
in Harare and Bulawayo, removing legally registered guns from and arresting a “rebel” in 
the latter.94  In August ZAPU offices were raided, and 10 people, including the new 
Mayor and Alderman of Bulawayo, were detained.95  A total 34 supporters of ZAPU 
were being detained including their chief parliamentary whip.96 The government 
attributed the August murder of 22 ethnic Shonas, most likely by RENAMO,97 to ZAPU, 
arresting 30 top ZAPU officials.98  In September, Minister of Home Affairs Enos Nkala 
said he wanted to “hit the dissidents at their roots and that root is ZAPU,” announcing his 
intention to “wipe out Mr Nkomo’s ZAPU party.”99  In response to this unrelenting 
pressure, and the 1985 election results, ZAPU restarted merger talks with ZANU that 
same month, with direct talks between Mugabe and Nkomo in October.100  Though 
dissident attacks continued, some apparently in opposition to ZANU-ZAPU merger talks 
and demanding the release of detained ZAPU leaders Dumiso Dabengwa and Gen 
Lookout Masuku,.101 Nkomo continued to speak in opposition to the attacks, seeking to 
isolate ZAPU from association with them.  In November, the Fifth Brigade was 
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redeployed to Matabeleland.  In December, Mugabe announced that “ZANU and ZAPU 
had agreed to establish a one-party state with socialist principles.”102 
By the start of 1986, moves toward ZANU-ZAPU unification were continuing 
with ZANU offering conciliatory gestures in order to close out a merger.  Nkomo’s 
brother Stephen and three other ZAPU leaders were released from jail in February.  The 
next month, Nkomo and Nkala appeared together at a rally in Matabeleland calling for 
citizen cooperation with the police to round up dissidents.103 That same month, Nkomo 
announced agreement on the details of merging of ZANU and ZAPU in March.104  
However, merger talks over the final details dragged on through the rest of the year.105  
In October agreement that Mugabe would become leader of the unified party was 
announced, something that appeared obvious based on electoral success but, based on the 
history of the two leaders, “one of the talks’ stickiest issues.”106  In recognition of a new 
alliance of the parties, about 200, mostly ZAPU supporters were released from detention 
shortly after the leadership announcement was made.107  The year ended with merger 
talks still ongoing, however, in another conciliatory gesture to push through a final 
merger agreement with the now subdued ZAPU party, more ZAPU political prisoners 
were released, including Dumiso Dabengwa who had been in prison for four years.108  
By the end of 1986 ZAPU had recognized its fate as a marginalized party representing its 
specific group, however never able to expand its success outside of this group who faced 
violence and intimidation each time they supported ZAPU.  Although the very final 
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merger of the two parties did not go through until 1987, by the end of 1986 the opposition 
movement was effectively over, leaving only the details of a merger to be worked 
through. 
While ZANU’s greatest focus was on ZAPU, its most significant (though still 
minor) political opponent, the government response to the other opposition parties, which 
had virtually no popular support at all, was equally intolerant.  In November 1981, 
Mugabe threatened to expel whites running farms and industries, claiming they were 
racists who continued to insult Zimbabwe’s black majority.109  At the end of 1982, Smith 
was accused of asking western nations to withhold aid disbursements.110  He was 
questioned by police and his homes raided, with legally registered weapons and 
paperwork related to his duties as an MP seized.111  In November 1983 Bishop Abel 
Muzorewa, leader of the UANC, was arrested on suspicion “of having subversive links 
with South Africa.”112  He was held for ten months before being released without ever 
facing actual charges, though successfully muting his opposition, again demonstrating the 
government’s willingness to use whatever means it had at its disposal to destroy 
opposition, no matter the source or size of the opposition.  
While the government faced little opposition from civil society in the 1980s, the 
government response to them was as disproportionate to the challenge posed as was the 
case with political opposition.  Immediately after independence steel workers and miners 
went on strike demanding better pay and seeking government support for their efforts113 
and women ZANU supporters demonstrated against police harassment, demanding a new 
“people’s police force” to replace the “general police force” inherited at independence.  
The women’s rally was, ironically, broken the force the women were campaigning 
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against.114  In October teachers and nurses went on strike demanding and again the police 
responded, arresting “about 750 striking nurses and teachers.”115  There were no other 
reports of strikes or protests during the early or mid-1980s.  The aggressive response to 
first ones likely discouraged further civic mobilization, while further demonstrating the 
government’s propensity to respond to any protest with unbounded suppression. 
The analysis above demonstrates a trend of swift and highly aggressive action by 
Mugabe against any form of opposition.  As ZAPU sought to establish a foothold within 
the political spectrum of Zimbabwe, Mugabe first attempted to envelope it by forming a 
coalition government that limited its opposition role.  Tepid criticism by ZAPU ministers 
with the government was met with a strategy to marginalize ZAPU within the cabinet and 
shift decision making from the government to the ZANU party, while delegitimizing 
ZAPU in society.  Having reduced its position in parliament after the 1985 election, 
Mugabe then moved to absorb ZAPU into ZANU by agreement, thus eliminating 
opposition legally.  The means to this end were illegal and violent.  Government 
agencies, party organs (the youth movement), and spontaneous groups of ‘supporters’ all 
contributed to intimidating opposition supporters into joining and voting for ZANU, with 
over 20,000 killed at the hands of the Fifth Brigade and many more killed, detained, or 
tortured by the CIO, regular police, and army, all under the auspices of suppressing a 
minimal ‘dissident’ problem.  Peaceful civic protests were similarly violently suppressed.  
Thus, what emerges from this study is a pattern of disproportionate response to any form 
of opposition, despite the legality of the formal mechanisms by which it was ultimately 
eliminated.    
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III. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO OPPOSITION DURING 
ECONOMIC DECLINE: 1998–2003 
Chapter II examined opposition action and government responses during a period 
of economic prosperity and positive international engagement with Mugabe and 
Zimbabwe.  This chapter examines opposition action and government responses during a 
period of sharp economic decline (Figure 2) and international criticism, 1998–2003.  Did 
opposition action and/or the nature of government response to opposition change as a 
result of the deteriorating economic situation?  Rather than attempting to separate the 
effects of the economic decline itself from those of the structural adjustment policies 
designed to address it, the analysis assumes that any change in opposition and/or 
government activity is attributable to adverse effects of structural adjustment.  Thus, the 
effects of structural adjustment are almost surely overstated, but this bias works against 
my hypothesis that there was no effect of structural adjustment on government repression 
of opposition.  In particular, the increased size of opposition, accepted to be as a result of 
failed structural adjustment, shows a larger amount of reaction required by the 
government as it attempted to suppress opposition.  While recognizing the size of 
opposition and response were varied, this chapter will identify the similarities in tactics 
used by Mugabe, his government, and his ZANU party as they waged a combined 





Figure 2.   1980s GDP Per Capita Zimbabwe and Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South 
Africa)116 
After a decade in which opposition to Mugabe and ZANU had been minimal, new 
sources of dissent arose toward the end of the 1990s, which were met by a political 
strategy very similar to that of the 1980s.  Suppression was advanced through verbal 
dismissal, torture by government agencies and security forces, arrests, torture and a 
revived ZANU Youth movement, now joined by a war veterans group, which harassed 
and intimidated all those opposing Mugabe under tacit approval from the government as 
it provided logistical support and ignored court orders to control the war veterans.  
Central to this time period was the creation of the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC).  Announced in September 1999 and formally launched in January 2000, the 
MDC grew out of the trade unions, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, former leader of the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).  The MDC offered the first real challenge 
to the continued electoral success of ZANU, drawing support not only from urban voters, 
who are generally in opposition, but also from a growing segment of population in 
Mugabe’s traditional stronghold of rural Zimbabwe. 
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The MDC was a truly multiracial, multiethnic party, drawing support from 
urban Shona and Ndebele speakers, professionals and workers, the 
Ndebele and eastern Shona rural areas (but not from Mugabe’s central 
Zimbabwe Shona-speaking heartland), and from whites of all 
backgrounds, especially farmers.117 
As a result of the broader cross section of the population the MDC found support in, the 
actions by the government against both its leaders and its supporters also proved to be 
more widely distributed across Zimbabwe, though no more brutal or oppressive than the 
attacks of the early 1980s against the more concentrated opposition of ZAPU in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands. 
While Mugabe sought to incorporate ZAPU into a unity government at the start of 
the 1980s,—before ultimately determining that, as an opposition party it was not a 
tolerable entity—he treated the MDC, from its inception, as opposition that must be 
undermined or have its relevance to Zimbabweans negated.  This was done through many 
of the same methods used against ZAPU in the 1980s, attempting to weaken its 
leadership and, at the same time, intimidating its supporters, again using all aspects of the 
government and ZANU party.  Within two days of the MDC being announced, Mugabe’s 
government began its assault, seeking to remove structural support for the opposition 
movement as fast as it could.  The Information Minister, Chen Chimutengwende, 
threatened to deport a Danish union leader, Georg Lemke, who was in Zimbabwe 
assisting with the formation of the MDC, accusing him of “implementing the destructive 
foreign policies of [his] government.”118  Lemke was recalled by the Danish Trade Union 
Council for International Development (DCTU) the following month to assure future 
DCTU access to Zimbabwe, rather than fighting over the specifics of whether Lemke 
should or should not be allowed to stay according to the organization.119  Multiple 
government agencies participated in the intimidation of the MDC, including the CIO, 
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which detained and tortured MDC members, supporters, and parliamentarians.120  In 
October 1999 Mugabe was clear that “there will never come a day when the MDC will 
rule this country, never, ever.”121  By the following spring, as the MDC gained 
momentum and farmers sued in court to try and overturn land seizures, the government 
accused the MDC of collaborating with Britain and America, seeking to associate the 
MDC and its support by farmers as simply ties to the former colonial and apartheid past.  
The Information Ministry went on to accuse the MDC of “concentrating on violence and 
the preparation of a full-scale military war,”122 accusations very similar to those made 
against ZAPU in the mid-1980s, after Mugabe had decided it could not be tolerated even 
as a member of a coalition government.  Mugabe used the justice system to tie up 
opposition leaders in legal battles, just as he had with the ZAPU leadership.  Several 
times Tsvangirai was charged with treason and subsequently acquitted, but not before 
long periods of time were spent in court or detention rather than campaigning for the 
MDC.123  The Zimbabwean police and army both also participated in the repression of 
the MDC, arresting, beating, and even killing members, or, again as in the 1980s, people 
simply deemed not to be ZANU members.124  The police were also complicit in violence 
by other forces, by failing to act in defense of law and order.125  One significant 
difference in government handling of opposition was the systematic use of torture against 
members and suspected members of the MDC.  Those responsible included “agents of 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) political party, 
police officials, agents of the Central Intelligence Organization, and … members of the 
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 pro-Mugabe youth militia.”126  The targeted detention and torture of MDC supporters 
and journalists provided yet another level of intimidation for those opposing the Mugabe 
and the government.  The ZANU youth movement, one generation younger, was active 
again, attacking MDC supporters and burning MDC homes, offices, and vehicles127 and 
even attempting assassination of Tsvangirai.128  As the 2000 constitutional referendum 
and parliamentary elections and 2002 presidential election would demonstrate, all of 
these forces together were insufficient to suppress the MDC or its popular support.   
The February 2000 referendum was a yes-no vote on a proposed new constitution, 
which would have returned the government to a bicameral parliament and established an 
executive president assisted by a prime minister, and extended indefinitely the period 
Mugabe could be President.  Mugabe added to the draft presented by the constitution 
committee authorization for the government to seize farmland without compensating the 
owners, assigning this responsibility to the British government.129  Land reform had been 
an important issue in Zimbabwe since independence.  The original Lancaster House 
agreement funded a willing seller-willing buyer program for transferring land from the 
tiny white minority to the black majority.  Although this funding source was meant to be 
available through 1996, funds were exhausted by 1988.130  The British government did 
not address this issue until a decade later in 1998, at which time it tied further land reform 
support to improved governance.  Mugabe was unwilling to undertake the required 
liberalization, especially in response to demands from the former colonial power.131  
Instead, he introduced the constitutional provision to authorize appropriation of white 
farms, ostensibly to advance long delayed racial equality.  The timing of the move 
                                                 
126 John Brinkley, Zimbabwe and the Politics of Torture (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 
2002), 1–2. 
127 “Mugabe Launches New Salvo at Britain,” The Guardian, January 14, 2002; “EU Sanctions Loom 
as Mugabe Ignores Deadline for Poll Plans,” The Guardian, January 19, 2002. 
128 Chikuhwa, Crisis of Governance, 121. 
129 Sara Rich Dorman, “NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe:  From Inclusion to 
Exclusion” Journal of Southern African Studies 28, no. 4 (2003), 854. 
130 Dashwood, “Inequality,” 217. 
131 John L. Moore, Zimbabwe’s Fight to the Finish: The Catalyst of the Free Market (London: Kegan 
Paul, 2003), 261. 
 32
suggests that land reform was primarily a political tool to buy support through 
redistribution of farm land and undermine the MDC, both by undermining its financial 
base and casting it as a tool of the white farmers.132  In its first true test of opposition, the 
MDC campaigned extensively against the referendum,133 opposing any increase in power 
for Mugabe.  In an example of the government’s monopolistic use of its state-owned 
media, the government broadcast extensive pro-referendum information while refusing to 
air opposition views, despite a high court order mandating it to do so.134  When the result 
of the referendum was announced, Mugabe encountered his first ever electoral defeat.  
The referendum was voted down 53 to 46 percent,135 with only 26 percent of the 
electorate even participating.  The main reason for the failed referendum was not the land 
reform provision, but rather “the increased powers and term of office of the president.”136 
Hatchard goes further, suggesting it was a “vote on the presidency of Robert Mugabe.”137 
Mugabe blamed the MDC and the white farmers, whom he saw as its financial 
backers, accusing them of directing their black workers, a traditional source of support 
for Mugabe, to vote no.138  Expropriating the farmers would dislodge a group he blamed 
for his failed referendum and remove a major source of funding to the MDC.  While 
accepting the will of the people to not alter the parliament or the powers of the president, 
Mugabe pursued the proposed constitutional provision authorizing seizure of land 
without reimbursement by passing it through parliament in April 2000.139  Mugabe then 
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used the war veterans to implement land seizures, buying favor with the war veterans 
who had previously rallied against him.  Chipesa farm, owned by Iain Kay, a prominent 
MDC supporter “was among the first farms to be invaded by an especially militant 
gang.”140  As the owners were driven from their farms, the war veterans intimidated the 
newly unemployed farm workers into supporting ZANU.141  In one case, 600 farm 
workers were beaten then told to attend a ZANU rally where they were held up as people 
returning to ZANU.142  War veterans began invading farms and beating and torturing the 
farm workers for not supporting ZANU on their own initiative.  Mugabe refused to 
follow a court order to deploy the police to remove the farm invaders, instead threatening 
farmers with “’very, very, very serious violence’ if they dared to resist his black 
supporters who [had] invaded their farms.”143   
The June 2000 parliamentary elections would differ from those of 1985, with far 
more widespread opposition to the government, however, the actions exerted by ZANU 
and the government were the same as in 1985.  The election campaign was marred from 
the beginning by violence endorsed by Mugabe and other ZANU leaders.144  Throughout 
the election process violence and intimidation were utilized by ZANU candidates, 
government agencies, and ZANU party members, including the ZANU Youth as “part of 
a strategy to diminish support for opposition parties.”145  Twenty-eight opposition 
supporters were reported killed between April and early June.146  Elsewhere, ZANU 
gangs razed Harare townships and rural villages across Zimbabwe, driving out MDC 
supporters who lived in them.147  “By the time the 2000 elections took place there were 
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very few parts of Zimbabwe, urban or rural, that had not been subjected to some form of 
state organized violence.”148  The ZANU plan succeeded in suppressing the opposition 
campaigns, with 200,000 acts of political violence in the first six months of 2000.  
Ultimately, the MDC were forced to stop campaigning in over 20 constituencies “a few 
weeks before the election,” mainly rural areas that were traditionally supportive of 
Mugabe and ZANU.149  While the majority of ZAPU opposition was concentrated in the 
Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe, the MDC supporters were spread throughout the 
country, thus requiring the government to expand the distribution of its actions, though 
these actions themselves, organized violence against election opposition, were 
unchanged. 
The rhetoric with which Mugabe and ZANU sought to undermine the opposition 
also remained the same.  Mugabe blamed election-related violence on the MDC,150 
which he accused of waging ‘war’ on the government.  Information Minister Chen 
Chimutengwende asserted in a broadcast on ZBC, which was published in the Herald the 
following day, the MDC was “both waging a war and preparing for an escalation of that 
war against the government of Zimbabwe and ZANU-PF.”151  Defense Minister Moven 
Mahachi warned crowds that those who voted against ZANU would be killed, pointing 
out: “I am the minister responsible for the defence therefore I am capable of killing.”152  
Like ZAPU, the MDC was unable to respond effectively, since it was banned from the 
state-owned media, forced to rely on independent newspapers, which reached a much 
smaller proportion of the population than state owned media, especially radio.  
Meanwhile, ZANU candidates, reflecting the words of their leaders, accusing the 
opposition of threatening war, and played up alleged support by white farmers for the 
MDC.   
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We are not happy with some white commercial farmers who are 
supporting the opposition” said Josaya Jungwe, the Masvingo provincial 
governor.  “We do not want another war.  If you want peace you should 
support me and the ruling party…. If you want trouble, then vote for 
another party.153 
The violence and intimidation during the election campaign was supplemented by 
election rigging.  Rotberg describes the election process a “shambles, with doctored voter 
rolls and Mugabe-designed constituency boundaries finalized a mere three weeks before 
the election and released to the opposition only by court order.”154  After the polls, 
international observer groups quickly declared the elections invalid, typically citing the 
widespread nature of violence and intimidation prior to the elections.  The EU Observer 
Mission released an interim report as soon as polls closed and before election results were 
even announced declaring that “the term free and fair is not applicable in these 
elections.”155  Following the publication of the results the EU’s final report reiterated that 
it was “not in the position to declare the election free and fair.”156  The Commonwealth 
Observers group also critiqued the violence and intimidation, citing what it referred to as 
“impediments placed in the way of enabling the electorate to freely choose their 
representatives.  We especially deplore the level and nature of politically-motivated 
violence which characterized the period leading up to polling days.”157  Despite all its 
efforts to affect the outcome, ZANU won a bare majority of 62 of the 120 seats, and the 
MDC with all but one of the remaining 58.158  Demonstrating the greater strength of the 
opposition versus ZAPU, this election still gave Mugabe a majority in government, but it 
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failed to provide him the two thirds majority he had possessed after the 1985 election and 
needed to pass future constitutional change without opposition support, something he was 
clearly unwilling to seek.159 
Mugabe’s government responded strongly and violently to both the level of 
support the MDC had received at the polls and MDC actions following the elections.  
Immediately after the election results were announced, the government deployed army 
and police details throughout the country to counter any post-election violence.  While 
this reason turned out not to be necessary, “there were numerous reports of people being 
beaten up who were not engaging in acts of violence.”  The beatings were handed out 
“punishing people in the towns for having voted for the MDC.”160  Nevertheless, the 
surprisingly strong showing by the MDC buoyed its confidence to speak out.  It citied 
violence and intimidation of voters as it challenged the results in 38 of the 62 
constituencies ZANU won.  Though only 12 were heard by the high court in the five 
years before the next general election, the MDC won 7, and another 2 on appeal.161  
Following the announcement of the elections at the end of July, the MDC rapidly called 
for a national strike to occur early in August 2000.162  Mugabe responded in August, 
increasing the scope of the land seizure program.  The army was now authorized to 
support the effort by “provid[ing] transport and logistics”163 and additional farms were 
added to the seizure list.  Originally comprising 841 farms, the list grew to over 3,000 as 
Mugabe continued to blame his electoral woes on the white farmers.164   
Beyond the immediate post-election period, Mugabe and his government 
continued to seek ways to undermine the MDC by attacking those who supported it.  The 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) took the land seizure program to court claiming it was 
illegal.  In response Mugabe announced that the CFU had “declared war on the people of 
                                                 
159 Hatchard, “Lessons on Constitution-Making,” 215. 
160 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, A Report on Post Election Violence, (Harare, Zimbabwe: 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2000), 3. 
161 Rotberg, Worst of the Worst, 173; Meredith, Mugabe, 216. 




Zimbabwe.”165  Individual supporters of the MDC continued to be attacked.  A 
systematic study of post-election violence in the July to September 2001 period, found 
“2,928 cases of beatings, 6 cases of rape, 586 cases of forced detention, and 20,853 cased 
of forced displacement.”  It reports that “73.3 percent of the violence was perpetrated by 
ZANU (PF) supporters, 16 percent by the police, 4.5 percent by the army and air force, 
2.3 percent by MDC and less than one per cent by the CIO.”166  Of the 38.3 percent of 
victims whose affiliation could be determined, 87 percent were MDC supporters.167  In 
addition to the land seizure program and continued violence against MDC supporters, 
Mugabe employed another tactic from his battle against ZAPU.  With a growing number 
of Zimbabweans being forced to rely on food aid as the land seizure program undermined 
Zimbabwe’s agricultural output, the government restricted food aid distributions to those 
with ZANU-PF membership cards,168 again forcing Zimbabweans to demonstrate 
support for ZANU in order to survive. 
Efforts to affect the outcome of the March 2002 presidential election were the 
strongest to date.  Mugabe sought to limit the MDC presence in the rural areas via 
violence and intimidation as always, but now also sought to limit its urban supporters’ 
access to polling stations, while banning voting by the diaspora outright.169  Media 
restrictions were increased, unapproved strikes banned, public gatherings limited, and 
voter education by any non-governmental organization outlawed.170  International 
election observers were invited but severely constrained.171 
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Youth squads were deployed to hunt down opposition supporters, creating 
a wave of terror.  They raided shops, destroyed houses, and set up 
roadblocks, dragging people out of buses and cars, demanding party cards.  
Whole swathes of the country were turned into ‘no-go’ areas, sealed off to 
prevent the MDC from campaigning there.172 
Violence was high and the government accused the MDC of “fanning the violence” so 
that the elections would be declared not “free and fair.”173  However, according to Amani 
Trust, 93 percent of electoral violence was performed by ZANU, the government, or their 
supporters, and only five percent by MDC supporters.  With a larger opposition support 
base to suppress, ZANU Youth played a larger role in the violence than it had in the 
1980s, being responsible for almost 20 percent of attacks.174   
When the election results were announced, Mugabe was declared the winner by 
418,809 votes, with 56 percent of the vote to Tsvangirai’s 42 percent.175  Tsvangirai 
“cried foul,” claiming that about 400,000 people were denied the right to vote due to 
insufficient polling stations and “800,000 extra shadow ballots were counted.”176  
Despite winning the election, the government launched reprisal attacks against those who 
voted for the opposition.  As many as 1,400 opposition supporters were arrested in the 
two days after the election results were announced, including 130 election observers, as 
the government went after “the MDC, trade union leaders, civic groups, [and] the 
media.”177 
Election observers again questioned the legitimacy of an election marred by 
violence, with the Commonwealth observers reporting “the conditions in Zimbabwe did 
not adequately allow for a free expression of will by the electors” and specifically 
highlighting their concern at the violence inflicted by ZANU youth members on 
                                                 
172 Meredith, Mugabe, 225-6. 
173 “Opposition MDC Deliberately Fanning Violence,” The Herald (Harare), February 27, 2002. 
174 Amani Trust, Beating Your Opposition, 18. 
175 “Zimbabwe: 2002 Presidential Election Results” www.eisa.org.za/WEP/zimresults2002.htm 
(accessed 8 May 2010). 
176 Rotberg, Worst of the Worst, 174. 
177 “Zimbabwe Elections: Aftermath: Mugabe Hauls in his Foes: MDC Official on Treason Charge,” 
The Guardian, March 13, 2002. 
 39
opposition supporters.178  The Norwegian Observer Mission was even more critical, 
declaring “the Presidential Elections failed to meet key, broadly accepted criteria for 
elections.”  It went on to condemn the violence before the election, the operation of the 
polling stations during the election, and the violent reprisals observed after the 
election.179  Finally, and perhaps most damning to Mugabe, the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), which has the lowest standards for acceptable 
elections and an inclination to support Mugabe, declared “the electoral process could not 
be said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards for elections in the SADC 
region.”180  While these types of reports led to the refusal by some countries such as the 
USA to recognize the election results,181 Mugabe continued to hold on to power.  As in 
the 1980s, the opposition party would continue to rally against Mugabe and ZANU but 
fail to dislodge him from his position.  While the smaller ZAPU opposition was 
convinced by the systematic repression of the 1980s to merge with (i.e., be absorbed by) 
ZANU in 1989, the larger MDC entered into a power-sharing agreement in 2008, much 
as ZAPU had in 1980.  MDC has a larger and stronger role in the new unity government, 
reflecting its larger support base.  Mugabe retained the presidency, with Tsvangirai as 
Prime Minister and cabinet positions more evenly divided between the two parties.  
Nevertheless, Mugabe once again effectively contained opposition, with Tsvangirai 
leading the effort to reestablish the international legitimacy of the Mugabe government 
and energize new foreign aid flows into the country.  
Although the non-MDC opposition was even smaller than the non-ZAPU 
opposition of the 1980s, it too was subject to repression as the government sought to 
negate any opposition voice, no matter how small.  State-owned media refused coverage 
to Independent MP Margaret Dongo, formerly a ZANU member, even when she made 
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speeches in Parliament.182  In 1999 a member of the Democratic Party’s executive 
national committee was attacked and “left for dead” by three men “suspected to be 
members of the CIO.”183  Similarly, following a stinging attack on Mugabe’s use of 
violence by Bishop Pius Ncube of Bulawayo, Ncube was informed by CIO members that 
he was now on a “hit-list.”184   
On the other hand, civic opposition was much higher in this period than in the 
1980s as a result of the dire economic situation, but the government response was again 
similar.  All expressions of opposition were declared illegal and protests were broken up 
using police violence and arrests to intimidate future thoughts of protest.  The Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) organized two nationwide general strikes in the first 
three months of 1998 protesting food shortages and mismanagement of the economy.  
The three-day strike in January was countered by 30,000 army troops, who used rifle 
butts and tear gas to disperse strikers,185 leaving a total of “eight deaths, uncounted 
injuries, and thousands of people being arrested and detained.”186  In response, ZCTU 
leaders called a two day strike in March, but instructed strikers to remain in their homes, 
successfully avoiding large-scale violence.187  In November 1998, union organizers 
urged strikers protesting a 67 percent increase in fuel prices to stay in the safety of their 
homes.  The strikers who chose to leave their homes and protest were met by riot police 
using tear gas, violence, and the death of one protester.188  The same month, Mugabe 
issued a presidential order “banning trade union strikes and threatening stern action 
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against union leaders,” effectively ending legal strike activity.189  A series of politically 
motivated strikes and protests, protesting the government’s mismanagement of the 
economy and elections, planned by MDC for December 2000 was cancelled by MDC 
leaders fearing “considerable bloodshed” after they were advised that the “president 
intended to meet the popular protests with force, and that violence would be used as an 
excuse to detain opposition leaders.”190  During July 2001 strikes over rising fuel and 
food prices, union leaders again directed strikers to stay at home and avoid protests that 
could invoke a violent response.  In response, the government announced another ban on 
strikes replacing the previous ban that had only existed for six months under the 
emergency powers used to initiate it, again threatening arrests.191  In 2003 eight union 
leaders were arrested the day before scheduled protests over the economy in an effort to 
disrupt planning.  When the protests went ahead anyway, protesters were beaten and 
arrested across the country, charged with illegal demonstrations.192 
There were fewer strikes with purely economic demands.  These were handled, 
much as in the 1980s, peacefully as long as strikers did not stage public protests.  When 
they did, the police again stepped in, physically breaking up the protest and arresting 
those involved.  In a seven-week doctors’ strike over pay and the condition of the 
healthcare system in the fall of 1999 Mugabe actually intervened in negotiations in order 
to facilitate a resolution.  The final agreement announced the doctors had secured from 
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system.193  In contrast to the doctors, striking hotel and food workers seeking increased 
pay held a protest rally, which was broken up by armed riot police firing tear gas at the 
protesters.194   
Similar to organized protests by unions against the economy or the handling of 
elections, student protests against inadequate government support were met with police 
violence and arrest.  Nationwide student protests in March 1998 got a mixed reaction.  In 
Gweru the protest was undisturbed, while in Harare students were clubbed by 
paramilitary police to break up the protest.195  It is not clear whether this was a result of a 
more peaceful protest in Gweru, or simply a different police response.  Police broke up 
student protests in February 1999, after marching students threw stones at police who had 
surrounded their protest.196  Another protest in October 1999 saw police use tear gas and 
batons during an apparently peaceful protest outside Parliament demanding increased 
grants to offset inflation197 and again in 2001 a student protest, this time over the death of 
a student killed by a soldier, was broken up by riot police using tear gas.198   
The media was also a target of repression in this period, as in the 1980s.  Two 
journalists from The Standard who reported a coup attempt in December 1998 were 
arrested and tortured by the police and then the army,199 while the government labeled 
the Standard “an enemy of the state.”200  As the attack on the independent media 
widened, ZANU youth were mobilized against The Standard and its sister paper, The 
Independent, staging marches that, in contrast to the student marches that were 
surrounded by riot police as they sought higher grants, were neither resisted nor 
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challenged by the police.  The abuse suffered by the two journalists was protested by the 
Zimbabwe Union of Journalists, 300 lawyers, and church and student groups.201  In one 
example case, 300 lawyers who “sat in the road in front of parliament” were removed by 
“riot police us[ing] dogs, batons and tear gas.”202 
Though the civil society strikes and protests in this period were more typically 
based on the poor state of the economy, higher in frequency, and more widespread 
because of the broader spectrum of the population they covered, the response from the 
government followed the model established in the 1980s, swift, usually violent, 
crackdown on any public protest against the government or its policies.  This response 
led the ZCTU and others to urge their members to remain at home rather than engage in 
organized protests, suggesting that the repressive policy succeeded in making protest 
invisible if not in eliminating it. 
The 1998 to 2005 period provides a clear picture of a leader still defending his 
power with violence and intimidation.  Because the scope of the opposition had 
increased, the level of government response was significantly higher than it had been in 
the 1980s.  However, the nature of the response remained consistent.  Political opposition 
was attacked both through violence, rhetoric, and arrests against opposition leaders, as 
well as intimidation through violence of those believed to be supporting the opposition.  
As in the 1980s, the opposition party, white minority, and media were all charged with 
‘waging a war against the government,’ requiring a war-like response.  Though the MDC 
would, like ZAPU before it, ultimately become co-opted into the ZANU government, the 
path taken by the government to reach this point was established long before the final 
point of defeat.  While ZAPU, as a smaller and more regional party representing a 
focused constituency, was merged into the ZANU party, the MDC represented a far 
larger population base and, therefore, has, at least so far, entered into a power-sharing 
agreement.  Either way, though, Mugabe retained his position.  Utilizing rhetoric, 
violence, and coercion, he has suppressed the opposition rather than accepting the 
potential for defeat or multi-party democracy. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
At the start of the 1990s, Zimbabwe implemented structural adjustment following 
IMF guidance to liberalize the economy and reduce government spending.  There is little 
argument that the SAPs left the Zimbabwean people worse off, by opening the economy 
to international competition while removing the government subsidies that had supported 
its industries and population.  But did this lead to an implosion in governance and an 
explosion in opposition forcing Mugabe into increasingly autocratic policies to maintain 
his power?   
In comparing the two periods of analysis, it becomes clear that Mugabe has never 
endorsed political opposition.  From the independence election through the 1985 general 
elections he promoted a one-party system that would not only abolish the parliamentary 
seats held exclusively for white Zimbabweans as part of the Lancaster House agreement, 
but also lead to the absorption of all political parties into the ZANU fold as they 
inevitably recognized their opposition as futile.  Initially attempting to subdue ZAPU 
opposition by including them in a unity government, Mugabe recognized ZAPU’s 
unwillingness to be muzzled in their opposition of his policies.  He then moved to 
marginalize ZAPU, even in its own home support base of Matabeleland, and then seized 
on opportunities to divest his government of ZAPU ministers in his cabinet.  Once 
Mugabe established ZAPU strictly as an opponent to the government, he and other senior 
members of ZANU framed opposition criticism as attacks that must be handled as a war 
against the Zimbabwe government.  Mugabe utilized speeches, arrests, abduction, 
property destruction, food embargoes, violence, intimidation, torture, and murder by 
himself, his government organizations, and the ZANU party in attempting to marginalize 
ZAPU into insignificance, seeking to persuade Zimbabwe that supporting anyone but 
ZANU was the wrong option and ultimately reducing the viability of ZAPU to the point 
that they accepted merging into ZANU.  Aside from the 20,000 deaths inflicted by 
Mugabe’s Fifth Brigade on Matabeleland, the police, CIO, government ministries, and 
ZANU Youth movement all pursued a relentless attack on any person or group opposing 
Mugabe and ZANU, promoting belief that nothing but supporting ZANU was safe.   
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Mugabe’s opposition at the turn of the century differed from that of ZAPU in the 
1980s.  The MDC represented a much larger spectrum of the population and was, 
therefore, significantly larger both in size of organization, diversity of action, and 
frequency of effect.  Accepting that this increase in opposition was fueled by an economy 
initially crumbling under the failure of SAPs, Mugabe’s response demonstrated the same 
desire to destroy any political opposition, employing the very same tactics against the 
MDC and its perceived supporters he had used against ZAPU, only more frequently and 
against the broader range of MDC actions and supporters.  He again used the government 
organizations of the police, army, and CIO, along with his ministries and the ZANU 
Youth movement, framing the actions in the context of a war fought by the government.  
This time, however, instead of the Fifth Brigade, Mugabe turned to the war veterans 
group from the guerilla war to end Rhodesian apartheid rule, unleashing them on the 
white farmers, and their black farm workers, who Mugabe believed had turned against 
him in the 2000 constitutional referendum.  Although there was a fraction of the 20,000 
deaths that had been committed by the Fifth Brigade, murders, torture, beatings, 
abductions, rape, and intimidation once again were the primary tactics used by the war 
veterans, supported by CIO information networks and army logistics aid, against anyone 
believed to be supporting ZANU opposition.  The CIO and police again arrested 
supporters and members of the opposition parties, particularly the MDC, the media, and a 
rejuvenated civil society, this time they also used torture to intimidate those challenging 
Mugabe, while charges similar to those pressed on ZAPU leaders were fabricated against 
MDC leaders to leave them busy fighting court battles rather than challenging Mugabe. 
Elections have followed a consistent path through both periods of analysis, though 
for the first time, Mugabe encountered a defeat at the polls in 2000.  With a limited 
exception in the lead up to the constitutional referendum in 2000, Mugabe has 
approached each national election, and most local elections, with a strong arm of violent 
oppression against those opposing ZANU, and their supporters.  This same mentality has 
then flowed through the varying levels of ZANU and the government, resulting in the 
same threats and actions being performed at each level.  Torture, intimidation, death 
threats, correlations to future war, and arrests of opponents have distracted and inhibited 
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the opposition parties from their campaigning, while government laws prohibiting public 
gatherings without prior police approval have often restricted opposition party’s abilities 
to even hold political rallies to present their election platforms.  The violence before 
elections has also been followed in a consistent manner by violence imparted by ZANU 
supporters and government agencies against those believe to have supported the 
opposition during the election once the polling results are announced, no matter the 
election result.  From evicting ZAPU supporters out of their homes across Zimbabwe in 
1985, to the use of the army to aid war veterans to attack farmers and farm workers 
believed to have perpetrated the defeat of the constitutional reform referendum in 2000 
and attacks by police and army units on those believed to have supported Tsvangirai in 
the 2002 presidential election, Mugabe and ZANU have consistently punished those not 
voting in accordance with Mugabe’s plan.  Following the referendum defeat in 2000, and 
likely reflecting a larger threat to electoral success for Mugabe, ballot rigging was also 
introduced into the presidential election in 2002, ensuring that, even if the intimidation 
and violence failed to persuade voters to support Mugabe, there would be only one 
possible person in power following the elections. 
Though the scope, frequency, and cause of strikes and protests have changed 
between the two periods, Mugabe’s response has remained unchanged.  While strikes 
were limited to the early, post-independence period and typically reflected those 
demanding the government’s aid for a more rapid disbursement of independence gain to 
the population, the 1998–2003 period saw strikes and protests throughout the period, 
usually aimed directly at the government either over its handling of the economy or in 
support of political opposition.  The early strikes of the 1980s could typically be 
described as coming from parts of the population impatient to receive their benefit from 
independence.  Often seeking higher wages the strikes were generally unopposed during 
their execution.  Protests during this time, however, were met with police action to break 
them up, usually with arrests but also with police violence.  In a similar fashion, the 
strikes of the later period of analysis, particularly those of a strictly economic focus, were 
usually met with only verbal opposition of the government.  Political strikes also faced 
only limited response, typically involving the government establishing laws banning 
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future strikes without government permission, while any form of protest associated with 
the strike was countered with police action.  Politically motivated protests against 
government policies met a similar response to other protests, with police breaking up any 
protests using dogs, batons, or clubs as necessary to disperse protesters whether they 
were conducting peaceful or riotous protests.  Arrests were again a common reaction to 
the protests, but it was the extreme violence handed down by the police and army units 
on protesters that succeeded in forcing those considering planning such events to 
sometimes choose to cancel protests across Zimbabwe rather than risk massive 
bloodshed.  While the use of tear gas and baton-wielding police when dealing with 
protesters is hardly the exclusive domain of Zimbabwean security forces, it is the 
consistent manner in which they meted out this punishment, along with the other 
violence, that provides the insight into the government’s handling of opposition protests. 
The media has to be assessed through two different lenses: state-owned media and 
independent media.  The government inherited a state-owned broadcast media at 
independence.  Shortly after independence it moved to secure a similar state-owned 
capacity within the print media, nationalizing several of the largest domestic newspapers 
in a deal to buy out the ownership from a South African company.  From then on, 
through both periods of study, Mugabe and the other senior members of the ZANU party 
used the state-owned media as a domain for the exclusive publication of the ZANU 
message, while boycotting the messages of opposition groups, even when mandated by 
court order to broadcast them.  This has permitted the government to promote not only its 
ZANU message, but also its views of the opposition groups—particularly its correlation 
of opposition as war—to Zimbabweans with limited balance of information.  While the 
broadcast media has remained the sole domain of the government, there were still 
independently owned newspapers publishing in Zimbabwe throughout the periods of 
assessment, although they faced progressively stricter and stricter laws into how and 
where they were able to report and conduct their business within Zimbabwe.  The arrests, 
torture, criminal charges, and expulsions of journalists when the government disliked the 
story they reported provided an air of intimidation and fear throughout the independent 
print media. 
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From the comparative analysis of the 1980–86 period with 1998–2003, it can be 
concluded that, while the economic conditions were starkly different, there is little 
difference in how Mugabe tackled opposition during his time in office.  Allowing that the 
change in political opposition and civil unrest was representative of a change in economic 
climate driven by the failures of SAP in the early 1990s, it is the very existence of 
opposition that underlines Mugabe’s position.  He is unwilling to accept opposition, be it 
from a single individual member of parliament or a political party representing almost 
half the population.  Mugabe attempted to immerse ZAPU within ZANU, exclude them, 
and then marginalize what was never more than a regional party representing 
approximately 20 percent of the population.  Even though ZAPU never represented an 
electoral threat to Mugabe, the mere presence of an opposing group was unfathomable to 
Mugabe.  By the time the MDC was formed, they represented a true threat to Mugabe, 
both in the eyes of the international community and the ballot box.  To Mugabe, though, 
opposition was opposition and therefore dealt with as such.   
With a consistent repression of opposition parties or individuals, Mugabe has 
continued to secure his position in charge of Zimbabwe over more than quarter of a 
century using whatever methods he finds necessary to break that opposition.  It is not, as 
some suggest, that a certain event has tipped Mugabe’s approach to a more autocratic rule 
of law, or undermined him is a manner that has forced an increase in violence and 
repression, but rather what may best be reflected by the Ndebele author of an open letter 
in the April 21, 2000 edition of the Guardian newspaper, whose own father had been 
attacked and killed by Mugabe’s troops in the 1980s:   
Mugabe does not like opposition of any kind, whether it is from black 
people or white people…. The west is only discovering now that Robert 
Mugabe is a delusional megalomaniac, yet people from the Matabeleland 
region of Zimbabwe have known this for the past 18 years or so. 
What is evident is that the international community must be more cognizant of 
post-war leaders, realizing that the leader of an armed conflict to overthrow an 
undesirable government is not always the right choice for a peacetime leader of a post-
conflict nation.  During the 1980s, the West was focused on the Cold War and willing to 
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tolerate “strongmen”203 as long as they were not communist men.  Next to apartheid 
South Africa, who progressively received a more and more negative focus from 
international attention as the 1980s unfolded, Zimbabwe was an asset not a liability.  By 
1998, however, both the Cold War and apartheid South Africa were history and the 
international community, instead, focused on its intolerance of poor governance.  Mugabe 
provided a perfect example of a leader unwilling to bend to the new western standard, 
instead pushing back at the ‘colonial’ inputs of the west.  While Zimbabwe certainly does 
not represent a unique case of a revolutionary leader failing to live up to his promises in a 
post-revolutionary environment, Mugabe serves as a perfect example of the traits and 
trends such a leader can display that must be recognized early to avoid such a secure 
entrenchment of a failed leader that he cannot be successfully challenged by opposition 
groups to rectify the situation.  Mugabe’s early rhetoric against the agreed to constitution, 
combined with his consistent willingness to use violence, murder, and intimidation to 
secure his power were all early indicators of a leader not ready to forego his title or his 
personal agenda for the good of his nation.   
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